

MC&G file

17 May 1968

25X1A

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT: MC&G Study

25X1A

1. The following are some of my preliminary comments on General Reynold's study forwarded by for your attention.

2. Conclusion 1 does not recognize that photographic products of a particular satellite system may meet accuracy criteria, both horizontal and vertical, for internal map control adjusted to local datums rather than to the WGS. If the problems of determining, with precision, the location of SAC targets and of tying all intelligence targets to the best possible WGS based grid are considered the primary intelligence objectives involved, the recommendation seems acceptable.


3. Conclusion 2 and its recommendation appears acceptable as worded, since it does not prohibit low priority coverage when the opportunity arises.

4. With regard to Conclusion 3, if the total mission cost includes the processing of the film (including dupes and prints), additional allocation to the MC&G community for cost of film from the primary cameras exposed solely for MC&G purposes would be double counting. An attempt to identify costs allocable to MC&G participation seems logical and would be useful. The recommendation appears acceptable. Whether the MC&G community would reduce its requirements, if it had to pay the costs on this basis, is another matter.

NRO review(s) completed.

5. With respect to Conclusion 4, attention is called to the first paragraph under IV 5 (page 20) as a statement of intelligence requirements within the mapping and charting fields. The most clean-cut solution to the problem posed in Conclusion 4 would be to adopt procedure "a", which would establish MC&G as an intelligence mission (including its/strictly/military operational requirements and conventional collection resources, exclusive of R&D). [The Director of DIA would probably be loath to accept this procedure, however handy it is from the bureaucratic standpoint. Procedure "b" puts the burden on the DoD to differentiate between the elements within the CIP that are of an intelligence nature and those of a military operational nature (with the suggestion in the recommendation that two groups of elements be separately identified in the future CIP budgets). The implication is that the military operational elements of MC&G programs would not be budgeted as part of the over-all intelligence program. The recommendation, although difficult to implement, will in all probability be the eventual solution if any action regarding the problem posed by Conclusion 4 is in fact demanded by the Director.

6. In a partial re-reading of part IV, I have found several places where I believe there could be some improvement in phrasing. I can bring these and others that I may pick up directly to the attention of General Reynold's staff, if you so desire. After further study I may find additional substantive points that you may wish to forward in your memorandum to the DD/I.



25X1